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Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions and the New Economy 
 
Julia Lynn Coronado and Phillip C. Copeland 
 
Abstract 
 
Many firms that sponsor traditional defined benefit pensions have converted their plans to 
cash balance plans in the last ten years.  Cash balance plans combine features of defined benefit 
(DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans, and yet their introduction has proven considerably 
more controversial than has the increasing popularity of DC plans.  The goal of this study is to 
estimate a hierarchy of the influences on the decision of a firm to convert its traditional defined 
benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan.  Our results indicate that cash balance conversions 
have been undertaken in competitive industries with tight labor markets and can be viewed 
largely as a response to better compensate a more mobile labor force.  Indeed, many firms appear 
to increase their pension liabilities through such conversions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions and the New Economy 
 
Julia Lynn Coronado and Phillip C. Copeland 
 
Introduction 
 
Many firms that sponsored traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans have converted 
these plans to cash balance (CB) pensions in recent years.  While cash balance plans are legally 
classified as DB pensions, they are often referred to as hybrid plans because they combine 
features of defined benefit and defined contribution (DC) plans.  We argue that in critical ways 
cash balance plans are most like DC plans, and thus, the popularity of these plans can be thought 
of as part of the broader trend toward DC-like pension offerings.  The number of CB conversions 
is notable; we estimate that converted plans now hold more than 40 percent of all DB assets.   In 
this paper, we examine the driving forces behind cash balance conversions, and in doing so shed 
light on the factors that underlie the general move towards DC pensions. 
 While the fraction of full-time workers covered by an employer-sponsored pension has 
remained fairly steady at just under 60 percent, the share of pension participants covered by DC 
pensions has grown from less than forty percent in the early 1980s to about 70 percent in the late 
1990s (Employee Benefits Research Institute, 2002 and Department of Labor, 2002).  Defined 
benefit and defined contribution pensions have fundamentally different characteristics in terms 
of benefit accrual over time, exposure to financial market risk, and portability across jobs.  
Understanding what has led to the dominance of DC plans in the pension landscape will in turn 
help determine the implications of this shift for the distribution and adequacy of retirement 
saving.   
Some of the hypotheses that have been considered for the shifting nature of pension 
coverage include that the costs of complying with the regulations put in place by the Employee 
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Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 made offering a DB plan prohibitively 
expensive.  In addition, some change in coverage could also occur if the structure of production 
in the economy shifts such that workers move into industries where DC pensions are more 
commonly offered.  Another hypothesis is that employers are trying to avoid the costs associated 
with generous DB plans when the workforce is aging, which would imply that the movement 
towards DC plans is reducing benefit generosity per worker.  The increasing popularity of DC 
plans could reflect a greater level of financial sophistication among workers that has led them to 
demand more control over their portfolios.  Finally, changes in production technology and labor 
market conditions could unravel the original motivations for offering DB pensions, which are 
characterized by back-loaded benefits that reward tenure and punish worker mobility.  
 Focusing on cash balance conversions has two advantages.  First, empirically establishing 
the determinants of the shift towards DC pensions has been difficult because relatively little of 
the change in coverage has been the result of direct substitution where a firm terminates a DB 
plan and establishes a DC plan in its place (Papke, 1999).  Declining DB coverage has often 
come as sponsoring firms themselves become smaller or disappear altogether, while increasing 
DC coverage has been among both firms that continue to sponsor DB plans and new firms.  Cash 
balance conversions are an example of direct substitution within a single firm in which a 
traditional DB plan is replaced with a DC-type plan, thus allowing us to examine the 
determinants of substitution by comparing the characteristics of converters with non-converters. 
Another reason that an examination of cash balance conversions is particularly 
illuminating is that they are regulated as DB plans under ERISA, and therefore the trend towards 
cash balance conversions suggests that factors other than regulatory burden are important in 
understanding the movement towards DC-like pension packages.   
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The conversion of traditional DB plans to CB plans has proven to be quite controversial, 
leading to congressional hearings and legislative attempts to block the adoption of CB plans.  
Affected participants who stand to lose benefits under such conversions have been quite vocal, 
and the popular press has characterized CB conversions as an attempt by employers to reduce 
overall benefit generosity in a way that is not transparent to workers.  It has also been suggested 
that firms would really like to terminate their DB plans but find it too costly to do so because of 
tax considerations.  Meanwhile, companies undertaking these conversions have countered that 
they are actually trying to better compete for mobile employees who realize little pension wealth 
under traditional DB pensions due to their lack of portability and delayed accrual. 
In this paper we construct a unique data set of firms who have undertaken cash balance 
conversions that allows us to estimate a hierarchy of factors driving the trend toward cash 
balance conversions.  Our results indicate that cash balance conversions have not reduced overall 
benefit generosity at the firm level, although some redistribution may be occurring among 
individual employees.  There is some evidence that tax considerations may play a role in a firm’s 
decision to convert to a CB plan rather than terminate its existing DB plan.  However, these 
conversions have generally been undertaken in competitive industries that are characterized by 
tight and highly mobile labor markets.  Since mobile workers benefit most from such 
conversions, we conclude that this trend may have positive implications for the eventual 
retirement wealth of participants.  
Shifting Pension Coverage 
In order to understand the factors that underlie the trend away from DB pensions it is 
useful to first review the models that have been used to rationalize their role in the labor market.1  
In contrast to DC plans, benefits in a DB pension do not accrue evenly over an employee’s 
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tenure; the most rapid period of benefit accrual occurs in the years just prior to retirement.  The 
back-loaded nature of benefits in a DB pension plan thus imposes a capital loss on workers who 
leave the firm before retirement.  Workers essentially post a bond with the firm by accepting this 
arrangement and forfeit the bond if they quit or are fired prior to retirement. 
Firms are generally thought to offer such arrangements in order to enhance productivity 
by reducing turnover, encouraging work effort, and regulating retirement behavior. 2   Reducing 
turnover may be desirable either because productive technology is enhanced by long-term 
commitments or team production, or because the firm has high training costs for new employees.  
A DB pension contract can also resolve inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard when the 
monitoring of worker effort is difficult or costly.  The capital loss incurred by the employee 
when separating from the employer provides an incentive to work hard and invest in firm-
specific human capital, thus boosting productivity.  A pension is simply a tax efficient way for 
firms to design a productivity enhancing deferred compensation arrangement and also gives 
firms a lever to induce workers to leave later in life when productivity wanes in a way that 
avoids claims of age discrimination.  
While the federal government regulates and insures private pension accruals, the fact that 
most benefits accrue at the end of an employee’s tenure in traditional DB plans means that much 
of the pension agreement is an implicit contract between workers and firms during an 
employee’s working years.  Sponsoring firms can renege on future pension accruals at any time, 
although they would incur reputation costs in doing so that would likely lower employee work 
effort and inhibit the firm’s ability to enter into such contracts in the future.  Thus the gains firms 
realize from increased productivity due to the back loading of compensation and the costs they 
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would incur from reneging on such promises serve as an enforcement mechanism for the implicit 
component of the pension contract. 
Given a credible enforcement mechanism, employees will accept these terms in order to 
reap the higher lifetime pay that results from their increased productivity.   Ippolito (1994) 
suggests that employees covered by DB pension contracts are also paid an indenture premium for 
foregoing the possibility of higher spot wages that may result from future job offers.  The degree 
of wage tilt during the working years and the amount of the pension in his model depend on the 
size and likelihood of receiving an outside offer of employment.  In contrast, DC plans are 
essentially a tax-favored saving account that is portable across jobs, and in which retirement 
wealth accumulates more evenly over an individual’s working life. 
Other reasons that workers may want pensions include the desire to earn tax-favored 
returns, or to realize economies of scale on the transaction costs of investment, although both of 
these goals can be realized in a DC plan as well as a DB plan.3  In a DB plan workers may also 
realize the opportunity to insure to some degree against mortality, inflation, macroeconomic, and 
disability risks through inter- and intra-generational risk sharing.   
 The aggregate statistics on pension coverage from a variety of sources show little change 
in pension coverage in the last three decades, with a growing share of workers covered by only 
DC plans.  Arguably, the critical distinction between DC and DB pension plans is that there is 
little or no wealth loss associated with separating from an employer prior to retirement in a DC 
plan.  While DC plans often have a vesting period and may feature graduated matching schedules 
in employer contributions that reward longevity, vesting generally occurs much sooner and 
benefits accrue much more evenly than in a DB plans.  DC plans also offer control over 
investments and are generally more portable across jobs. 
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A couple of recent papers have explored the factors that might lead such arrangements to 
break down within the implicit contracting theoretical framework that rationalizes the existence 
of DB pensions plans.  Both Friedberg and Owyang (2002) and Balan (2003) suggest that these 
contracts could become unstable in the face of changes in production technology that led to a 
relatively higher return to general versus firm-specific human capital.  Such a shift in production 
technology would lead to higher employee mobility and shorter average tenure, making the 
retention of employees with a DB contract prohibitively expensive even for firms that still realize 
a gain from longer tenure due to the higher probability employees face of receiving a more 
lucrative outside offer of employment.  Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the return to 
general human capital has risen faster than the return to firm-specific human capital in recent 
years, particularly for new labor market entrants (Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney, 2002).   
We might thus expect to see substitution away from traditional DB contracts in industries 
characterized by mobile, and perhaps also by younger, workers.   
While the stylized facts on pension coverage suggest substitution of DC for DB pensions, 
and there are a number of hypotheses to explain this shift, much of the empirical work to date 
has focused on debating whether this substitution has in fact occurred.  One branch of research 
uses household level data to assess the degree to which the sharp increase in DC wealth can be 
considered to be new saving, a finding that would be consistent with little direct substitution of 
DC for DB pensions.4  The results from this literature range from concluding that all of the 
increase in DC wealth is new saving to suggesting that none of the rise is new saving, thus 
preventing us from drawing much insight about the determinants of shifting pension coverage. 
 Another group of papers uses firm level data to examine the degree of substitution of DC 
for DB pensions.  In the years immediately following the introduction of 401(k) plans, a number 
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of studies concluded that a significant portion of the change in coverage was due to workers 
moving to industries where DC plans were more commonly offered than DB plans.5  Papke 
(1999) used the same data for the period 1985-92 and found more direct substitution; a fifth of 
firms sponsoring DB pensions terminated these plans in favor of DC arrangements over this 
period.  The focus of Papke’s study was establishing that direct substitution was indeed taking 
place, and she did not explore the determinants of why some firms terminated their plans while 
others did not.  However, the finding of direct substitution suggests a behavioral response by 
firms to changing production technology, demographics, or labor market conditions.  Our 
analysis explores another channel of direct substitution; that of cash balance pension plans for a 
traditional DB arrangement, and we extend the analysis to establish the determinants of such 
substitution. 
Cash Balance Conversions: Issues and Evidence 
Cash balance plans combine features of defined benefit and defined contribution pension 
plans.  Legally, cash balance plans are DB plans and are regulated as such under ERISA, and 
thus the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures benefits in such plans.  Similar 
to a DC plan, however, employers regularly set aside a percentage of the employee’s pay in an 
individual “account”.  The account is only a notional account and employees have no choice 
about how funds are invested.  The employer invests the pooled assets of the pension plan and 
bears the investment risk, just as in a DB plan.  The funds in the account earn a rate of return 
guaranteed by the employer, usually a rate linked to their discount rate, and the employee 
receives a periodic statement on their account status.  Upon retirement, what the employee has 
accrued in their notional account is their retirement benefit and they can generally take it as a 
lump sum.   
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Two features of cash balance plans make them more similar as a form of compensation to 
a DC pension: Benefits accrue earlier in a participant’s career and employees can take a pre-
retirement lump sum distribution from the plan if they leave the firm.  Under both traditional DB 
and cash balance plans, employees accrue benefits in each year of work, and the present value of 
benefits accrued is called the projected benefit obligation, or PBO.  The PBO under a typical 
cash balance pension plan and a traditional DB plan are shown in Figure 1.  The PBO is the 
actuarial present value of benefits earned by an employee for service rendered prior to that date 
plus projected benefits attributable to future salary increases.  In the chart, the age of an 
employee is on the horizontal axis and the vertical axis measures multiples of the employee’s 
annual salary.  The kink in the PBO under the traditional DB plan is when the employee qualifies 
for the early retirement subsidy, a feature common in DB plans but not in cash balance plans.  
Under the cash balance plan, the value of the pension right is larger at earlier ages and can be 
withdrawn by employees if they change jobs.6   
Figure 1 here 
As discussed above, the deferred accrual--or back-loading of benefits--under traditional 
DB plans is an inducement for employees to stay with the firm, since they forfeit a significant 
amount of future compensation if they leave.  The defining characteristic of cash balance plans is 
that they remove the penalty to the employee for changing firms through earlier benefit accrual 
and portability of benefits.   
The first company to convert its traditional DB pension plan to a cash balance plan was 
Bank of America in the mid 1980s.  However, the popularity of cash balance conversions really 
took root in the mid-1990s.  By 1998, approximately eleven percent of all DB plans had 
converted to cash balance plans.  Converting companies were generally larger; 24 percent of 
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S&P 500 firms with DB pensions had converted their pension plans by 1998.  Converted plans at 
that time held about 30 percent of the assets and cover 25 percent of the employees covered by 
DB pension plans.  However, most converting plans had grandfathering provisions that allowed 
older workers to remain under the provisions of the traditional DB plan, which would mean that 
some assets and employees in converted plans are still associated with the old DB plans.  
Most cash balance conversions were undertaken with little fanfare.  The exception was 
IBM, whose conversion catapulted the cash balance trend into the media and Congressional 
spotlight.  Cash balance conversions were characterized in the media as an example of corporate 
greed; a way to reduce benefits generosity in a way that employees did not fully understand.  An 
examination of the PBOs graphed in chart 1 illustrates that any employee who places a high 
probability on staying with the same firm until retirement and is switched from a traditional DB 
pension plan to a cash balance plan will generally take a significant hit to their expected future 
retirement wealth.  However those who place a low probability on staying with the firm until 
retirement will realize a greater pension benefit under a cash balance plan.     
It has been suggested that employers are reneging on the implicit component of their 
traditional DB arrangements through cash balance conversions (Ippolito, 2001; Gold, 2003).  
This is certainly plausible given the slower accrual under cash balance plans prior to retirement 
and the fact that pension regulations only require employers to pay what has been accrued to 
date.  This would be feasible if the employers undertaking these conversions have relatively 
strong bargaining positions and are looking to reduce costs; perhaps they are facing an older 
population nearing their period of rapid benefit accrual.  However, these employers would incur 
reputation costs and potentially reductions in productivity.  Thus, many of these conversions 
have included granfathering provisions that allow employees that place a high probability on 
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staying to remain in the old plan while moving younger employees to the cash balance plan.  
This is a potentially benefit increasing proposition for employers and would make sense if they 
have relatively weak bargaining power and whose employees place a lower probability on 
staying with the firm. 
Regardless of whether or not the firm is seeking to renege on their implicit contracts with 
workers, in lieu of a CB conversion they could simply terminate their DB plan and establish a 
DC pension in its place.  Ippolito (2001) suggests that is precisely what firms who undertake 
these conversions would like to do.  He argues that firms do not do so because their pension 
plans are overfunded and they would face stiff tax penalties on their excess assets.  The tax on 
excess assets in a terminated plan, known as the reversion tax, was raised to 50 percent in 1990, 
from 15 percent.  A cash balance conversion is a way of establishing a DC-like pension plan 
while avoiding the reversion tax.  Niehaus and Yu (2002) examine the reversion tax hypothesis 
using firm level data, and find that most firms undertaking conversions are profitable and had 
overfunded pension plans on the eve of conversion.  They conclude that firms might otherwise 
terminate their DB plan in favor of a DC plan in the absence of the stiff tax penalties on excess 
assets, but that firms were not necessarily undertaking these conversions in order to cut benefits. 
Much of the empirical work on cash balance conversions to date has focused on their 
redistributive consequences.  One group of papers used profiles of workers with different wage 
and tenure patterns to simulate winners and losers under several actual conversions (Brown et al., 
2000; Clark and Schieber, 2000; Clark and Schieber, 2001).  The main findings of these studies 
were that pension wealth is transferred from single jobholders to multiple jobholders, and that 
the elimination of early retirement subsidies is the primary source of benefit loss to single 
jobholders.  Another paper by Johnson and Ucello (2001) used data from the Health and 
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Retirement Survey and concluded that pension wealth would be more equally distributed if cash 
balance plans had been the norm for the current generation nearing retirement, with multiple job 
holders gaining and single job holders losing pension wealth.  The results of these papers are 
suggestive of the idea that a shift in labor market mobility is important in understanding the 
move away from traditional DB plans. 
Empirical Analysis 
 In order to estimate a hierarchy of the influences on the decision of firms to convert their 
traditional defined benefit pension plans to cash balance plans, we construct a data set that 
combines firm level and pension plan data with industry-level data on labor market conditions.  
We can distinguish between motivations arising from tax avoidance, the desire to cut costs 
through a reduction in benefits, and attempts to compete for mobile workers.      
We proceed in two stages.  In the first stage we look at whether firms reduce benefits 
through cash balance conversions, as well as the extent to which this trend is driven by tax 
considerations.  We use detailed data before and after conversion on the finances of a relatively 
small number of individual pension funds for which we could identify the conversion date.  In 
the second stage we use a broader analysis of all S&P 500 firms that sponsor a DB pension plan 
and include data on industry-specific labor market conditions that allow us evaluate the influence 
of labor market dynamics along with some of the potential determinants of the probability that a 
firm will convert its DB pension into a cash balance plan. 
Stage One:  Benefit Generosity and the Reversion Tax Hypotheses 
 In order to test whether a cash balance conversion reduces the overall generosity of the 
pension plan, we look at the forward-looking measure of a pension plan’s liability before and 
after a conversion.  We use the projected benefit obligation, which was described above and 
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graphed in chart 1.  The PBO is the actuarial present value of benefits earned by employees to 
date incorporating assumptions about how the value of those benefits will increase over time due 
to future salary growth.  Since the PBO only measures accrued benefits, and not the value of the 
pension if the employees stay until retirement, it will not capture the full extent to which the firm 
is appropriating the pension bonds of its employees.  However, because the PBO takes into 
account assumptions about future salary growth, it is always greater than the accumulated benefit 
obligation that is insured by federal pension regulation and, thus, better captures changes in the 
overall benefit generosity of the plan.  If firms are seeking to reduce benefits generosity, the PBO 
of the pension plan will decline upon conversion.  Alternatively, if firms allow employees who 
are closer to retirement to choose to stay in the plan while shifting newer employees to the cash 
balance plan, the PBO will likely increase upon conversion.  
The testable implication of the hypothesis that the decision to switch to a cash balance 
pension plan instead of terminating a DB plan is driven by tax considerations is that firms who 
switch to cash balance plans should be overfunded prior to conversion.  The relevant funding for 
tax law is determined by the market value of plan assets relative to the accumulated benefit 
obligation.  However, the data on ABOs is sparse, as the accounting standards that govern 
pension disclosure do not require firms to report the ABO in their financial statements so we use 
a funding ratio based on the PBO.  If a plan is overfunded based on the PBO it is certainly 
overfunded based on the ABO, thus if we find that most converting firms are overfunded based 
on the PBO we can conclude that tax considerations may be an important influence in their 
decisions.  However a firm could be underfunded on a PBO basis but overfunded on an ABO 
basis.  Thus, if we find that plans are underfunded prior to conversion this does not conclusively 
suggest that tax considerations play no role. 
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 The examination of funding ratios and changes in PBOs after a cash balance conversion 
is simple in concept, however the task is made difficult by the fact that there are no disclosure 
requirements for a conversion.  Thus, we first identified firms who had converted their traditional 
DB pensions to cash balance plans as of 1998 using the results of a survey conducted by 
Pensions and Investments, which we augmented using sources in the benefits consulting 
industry, and information included in 10k reports.  Because 10k filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission were one of our primary sources of data, we focused on publicly traded 
firms in the S&P 500 resulting in 75 firms who had converted their pensions to cash balance 
plans before 2000.  To determine the date of conversion, we then searched the financial 
statements of these firms.  We identified the date of conversion and were able to obtain 
information on funding and pension liabilities in the year before, the year of, and the year after 
conversion for 32 firms, or less than half of the total sample. 
 The firms in our sample are listed by industry in the first column of Table 1.  The year 
they converted to a cash balance plan is shown in the second column.  The earliest converters in 
our sample were RJR Nabisco and Bellsouth in 1993, while fully one quarter of the sample 
converted in 1999.  The funding ratio, calculated as the market value of assets over the PBO, in 
the year prior to conversion is shown in the third column.  More than a third of the firms in the 
sample are more than 5 percent overfunded in the year prior to conversion, suggesting that 
terminating their existing DB plan would involve a significant loss of money.  Another third of 
the sample is more than five percent underfunded in the year prior to conversion.  However, this 
funding is based on the PBO, while the funding relevant for tax law is based on the ABO.  For 
this latter group of firms, we were able to find their ABO in 1994 and calculate an ABO-based 
funding ratio.  Indeed, half of this group was in fact overfunded based on their ABO in 1994, a 
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year that preceded all of their conversions.  Given financial market conditions in the years 
between 1994 and their conversion, it is likely that these firms were also overfunded based on 
their ABO in the year prior to conversion.  Thus, it is quite possible that in the absence of 
overfunding, these firms may have decided to terminate their existing DB plans and establish a 
DC plan in its place. 
Table 1 here 
 The percentage change in the PBO between the year after conversion and the year prior 
to conversion is shown in the fourth column.  Pension liabilities increased upon conversion for 
two thirds of the sample, with increases of more than 10 percent for half of these firms.  If a firm 
wanted to disguise a decrease in benefits resulting from a cash balance conversion, it could 
decrease its assumed discount rate in the year of conversion to raise its post-conversion 
obligations.  Of course, discount rates must track bond market conditions, and rates were 
generally falling over this period.  So a firm could reduce its discount rate after conversion for 
sound economic reasons; indeed, as shown in the last column, half of the sample did decrease 
their assumed discount rate between the year prior and the year following conversion.  In any 
case, we want to be sure our conclusions about benefit generosity are not driven by changes in 
discount rates.   
We estimated how changes in the discount rate affect changes in the PBO by regressing 
percentage changes in the PBO on changes in the discount rate in the two years prior and the two 
years following conversion.  The resulting coefficient suggested that a one percentage point 
decrease in the discount rate would be associated with a five percentage point rise in the PBO.  
We use this coefficient to adjust the change in reported PBO, and the adjusted measure is 
reported in the fifth column.  The conclusions do not change:  the majority of firms increased 
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their liabilities as a result of their conversion.  If firms were simply appropriating the pension 
bonds of their workers than they would provide employees with an initial cash balance valued at 
the ABO, and the PBO would decline upon conversion.  It appears that many firms may have 
allowed longer tenure employees to remain under the old plan, or provided them with an initial 
cash balance of equivalent value, while moving employees with fewer years of service to the 
new plan. 
One concern in drawing conclusions based on the sample of firms for which we could 
identify conversion dates is that there may be a selection bias; firms who are most generous to 
employees in their cash balance conversions may be more likely to disclose information about 
the conversion in the footnotes to their financial statements.  Testing for this selection bias is 
difficult given that it would require comparing characteristics of the firms prior to the 
conversion.  However, we did compare the firms using data from 1998 and found that those 
firms for which we could identify conversion dates did not significantly differ from the other 
converting firms in terms of the value of plan assets, the industry distribution, or the funding 
ratio.  Another check on the degree to which selection is affecting our results in the first phase 
will be the consistency of the conclusions between the first and second phases of the analysis. 
Stage Two:  The Influence of Industry Labor Market Conditions 
 The evidence presented thus far suggests that the reversion tax on excess funding may 
have led firms to choose cash balance plans over terminating their traditional DB pension and 
establishing a 401k plan in its place; however it does not appear that most converters are 
necessarily reneging on the promised value of pension benefits.  Under implicit contract theory, 
firms would suffer reputation costs and current productivity if they chose to appropriate the 
pension bonds posted by their employees.  While changes in labor market conditions could lead 
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the traditional DB contract to break down, it does not necessarily follow that the level of 
compensation will also decline.  In this phase of our analysis we broaden our sample to include 
all firms in the S&P 500 that sponsor a DB pension plan and incorporate industry-level data on 
labor market conditions.  We estimate the determinants of the probability that a firm will convert 
its traditional DB plan to a cash balance plan including the pension plan’s financial position, 
industry demographics, and labor market dynamics.   
 Our sample consists of 319 firms, 75 of which had converted their pension plan to a cash 
balance plan by 1998.  We compile a number of industry characteristics from a variety of data 
sources, where industry is defined at the level of 2-digit SIC codes.  The values of the industry 
measures are shown in Table 2.  The first column of shows the percent of DB pensions in the 
industry that have been converted to cash balance plans.  The identification of these firms was 
the same as in the first phase of the analysis.  The rate of cash balance conversions is highly 
concentrated by industry: it is as low as zero and as high as 55 percent.  The degree of 
concentration raises questions about explanations for the declining popularity of DB pensions 
that have relied on the regulatory burden of these plans or the desire by firms to cut benefits 
across the board:  Neither of these hypotheses would necessarily translate into different 
conversion rates across industries.  The percent of firms in the industry with a DB pension was 
derived for 1998 using data from Compustat and is shown in the second column.  The 
sponsorship rate of DB pension plans also differs across industries, ranging from 25 percent for 
construction to 90 percent for utilities and sanitation services. 
Table 2 here 
 Capturing industry-specific labor market mobility is key to testing the some of the 
predictions of implicit contract models.  There are a number of reasons workers could change 
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jobs, including cyclical factors in which workers are hired or fired due to the trajectory of 
business activity in a sector.  Alternatively, workers could be hired or fired more frequently if 
they have relatively little bargaining power and, hence, job security.  One of the more difficult to 
measure and frequently overlooked measures of worker mobility occurs when workers have 
relatively strong bargaining power and are able to change jobs without any period of 
unemployment.  A measure of this kind of mobility, referred to as the employer-to-employer 
(EE) rate of job change, was developed by Fallick and Fleischman (2001) using data from the 
Current Population Survey.  The EE rate is shown by industry in the third column of Table 2.  
The measure represents the percent of workers in an industry who left their jobs for other jobs (in 
the same or a different industry) without a spell of unemployment.  Shifts in this type of worker 
mobility would likely lead to a breakdown in the traditional DB contract as employees place a 
lower probability on staying with the firm and therefore place little value on the existing DB 
pension promise.  In order to keep these employees, firms would have to increase the value of 
the DB pension beyond the point that it is worth the enhanced productivity from longer tenure.  
The EE rate ranges from 1.3 percent or workers leaving their employers for another job in the 
transportation industry to 4.3 percent of workers in technology and business services.  
 The fourth column of Table 2 shows the percent of employees in an industry that are over 
45 years of age in 1998, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This measure gets at both 
the benefits generosity and labor market mobility hypotheses.  If the employer is facing a large 
number of workers who are nearing their most rapid phase of benefits accrual and wants to avoid 
the associated increases in pension costs, then a cash balance plan could be a mechanism for 
reducing future pension accruals.  Alternatively if the employer has a relatively young and 
mobile workforce that places low probability of staying until retirement then a cash balance 
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conversion could prove a more valuable form of compensation to these employees.  The cost 
saving in future pension accruals could be relatively little or they could actually increase.  Ideally 
we would have the age distribution of employees at the firm level; however, we are assuming the 
firm’s distribution will be correlated with the industry average.      
Unemployment rates for 1998 are displayed by industry in the last column of the table, 
also obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.7  The unemployment rate is a proxy for the 
relative bargaining power of employers and employees.  If there was a lot of slack in the labor 
market, firms might have relatively strong bargaining positions and would perhaps be able to 
appropriate the pension bonds of their employees.  However, if firms face tight labor markets 
they would have less ability to cut benefits.  The unemployment rate in this period ranged from 
roughly 2-1/2 percent in the utilities and sanitation services, communication, and finance, 
insurance and real estate industries to 7-1/2 percent in the construction industry. 
The simple correlations of these industry-level variable are presented in Table 3.  The rate of 
cash balance conversions in an industry is negatively correlated with the DB sponsorship rate in 
the same industry.  Thus, the less likely a firm’s competitors are offering a DB plan, the more 
likely it is that a firm with an existing DB plan will convert it to a cash balance plan.  
Conversions are positively correlated with the EE rate, so that mobile employees are associated 
with a higher fraction of cash balance offerings.  Relatively older workers and greater labor 
market slack are both negatively correlated with the rate of cash balance conversions.  Thus, the 
simple correlations are consistent with an implicit contract story of firms undertaking cash 
balance conversions to better compete for younger, more mobile workers in tight labor markets. 
Table 3 here 
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We sort through the various influences in a multivariate regression framework.  We know 
all firms in the S&P 500 who converted their traditional DB plan to a cash balance plan as of 
1998.  However, some firms converted their plans after 1998, while still others may convert their 
plans in the future.  Ideally we could estimate a hazard rate of the probability that a firm will 
convert its pension to a cash balance plan taking into account dynamic information on the 
variables of interest and the conversion dates of those plans that already made the switch.  
Unfortunately we do not know the conversion dates for this broader sample and are unable 
therefore to estimate a dynamic model.  Instead, we estimate a probit model of the probability 
that a firm with an existing DB pension plan converted to a cash balance plan, using both the 
sample that had converted as of 1998, as well as those that we know have converted since that 
time.   
In essence this approach assumes that there is no duration effect, that is, the probability of 
cash balance conversion is unaffected by how long the firms have maintained their traditional 
DB plans.  There is no intuitive reason to expect a duration effect; rather the probability of 
conversion is likely influenced by current labor and financial market conditions.  The validity of 
our results thus relies on the relative cross-sectional patterns of the independent variables 
remaining stable over time.  We estimate the model measuring the explanatory variables as of 
1998, when we know that most of these firms had already converted, as well as 1994 when we 
know both anecdotally and from our first stage analysis that the conversion wave was just getting 
underway.  
Explanatory variables include the industry-level measures described above, which are 
designed to measure the effect of labor market conditions on the firm’s conversion decision.  To 
capture scale effects that may result from the fixed costs associated with any reform to a pension 
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plan, we include  the log of plan assets.  We also include the (PBO-based) funding ratio, which 
may be an important influence if the firm’s decision to convert to a cash balance plan rather than 
terminate the DB plan in favor of a DC plan is driven by tax penalties on excess assets.  Not 
knowing the conversion date implies that the tax law influence will be potentially poorly 
measured, as the funding ratio will only be important in the periods prior to the conversion.  
However, this is a cross-sectional analysis and thus the estimated coefficient will measure the 
effect of the relative funding positions among firms, which is not very likely to change much 
over time and therefore should capture to some extent the degree to which the financial position 
of the plan influenced the conversion decision.  The results are presented in Table 4 where the 
estimated marginal effects calculated at the means of the variables of interest are shown and t-
statistics are given below the estimated marginal effects in parentheses.  
Table 4 here 
In the first column results are presented where the variables of interest are measured as of 
1998 and no industry dummies are included.  The only variables that have significant 
explanatory power for the probability that a firm converted its pension plan to a cash balance 
plan are the log of plan assets and the industry unemployment rate.  The coefficient on plan 
assets suggests that scale effects are important, the larger the plan, the more likely is a 
conversion.  The coefficient on the industry unemployment rate suggests that conversions are 
more likely in tighter labor markets.  The percent of firms in the industry with a DB pension, the 
funding position of the plan, and the rate that employees in the industry change jobs without a 
spell of unemployment do not significantly affect the probability of conversion in this 
specification.  The pseudo R-squared, which is the analogous measure for maximum likelihood 
models to the coefficient of determination, is presented at the bottom of the table.  A value of 
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zero corresponds to predictive power equivalent to that of regressing the independent variable on 
a constant, whereas a value of one implies the model has perfect predictive power.  The 
specification in the first column has fairly modest predictive power. 
We add industry dummies to this specification and the results are presented in the second 
column of the table, although the coefficients on the industry dummies are not presented.  The 
explanatory variables that measure labor market conditions vary only by industry, so that 
including industry dummy variables is essentially allowing for a nonlinear effect of these 
measures.  It would also imply that a correct interpretation of the marginal effect of industry 
labor market measures would require incorporating the coefficient on the dummy variable.  
However, given the limitations of the cross-sectional analysis we are focused on the sign and 
relative importance of the independent variables and do not put too fine a point on the estimated 
marginal effects.  The size of the plan continues to have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of conversion in this specification, while the effect of the industry unemployment 
rate, while still indicating a positive effect from tight labor markets, is no longer significant.  The 
employer-to-employer rate also has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
conversion, indicating that more mobile workers influence firms to change their pension 
offerings.  The point estimate on the percent of the labor force over 45 in this all other 
specifications is negative, indicating that a higher fraction of older workers reduces the 
probability of conversion, contradicting the idea that a driving force behind the popularity of 
cash balance plans is an aging workforce.  Funding status and the fraction of DB offerings in the 
industry continue to be statistically unimportant, and the point estimates are quite small.  Overall, 
the explanatory power of the regression improves considerably when the industry dummy 
variables are included. 
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We know that most of the firms in our sample that converted to a cash balance plan did 
so by 1998, and that most of them did so after 1994.  Thus far our variables of interest have been 
measured in 1998, however it is the financial and labor market conditions prior to their 
conversion will be the relevant influence on their conversion decision.  It is also possible that if 
the reduction of penalties to leaving an employer inherent in a cash balance plan facilitated 
mobility within an industry, we could have a problem if endogeneity in the employer to 
employer rate in 1998.  In the third column we present the results of measuring the variables of 
interest in 1994.  The third column shows the results without industry dummy variables, which 
are qualitatively similar to the regressions using 1998 data; plan size, greater mobility and tighter 
labor markets lead to a greater probability that a firm will convert its pension to a cash balance 
plan, while funding, age of workers, and the percent of other firms in the industry that offer a DB 
plan are not significant determinants of this decision.  The fit of the regression is better than that 
of the comparable specification using 1998 data shown in the first column. 
The last column in the table shows the results from using the plan financial and labor 
market variables as of 1994 and including industry dummy variables.  The fit of the regression is 
better than that of the other three specifications.  The size of the plan is still a significant 
determinant of the probability of cash balance conversion and the point estimate is similar to the 
other specifications.  The unemployment rate has an economically and statistically significant 
effect on the conversion decision, as does the employer-to-employer rate.  The fraction of the 
labor force over 45 has significant explanatory power in this regression and is negatively 
associated with cash balance conversions.  The percent of firms with a DB plan is also 
significant and suggests that the greater the fraction of competitors with a DB plan, the less 
likely a firm is to convert its plan to a cash balance plan. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shed light on the motivations of firms that convert their traditional 
DB pensions to cash balance plans.  Our results suggest that, while avoidance of the reversion 
tax may have led some firms to choose cash balance conversions over termination of their 
traditional DB plan, it does not appear that most firms are seeking to reduce benefit generosity.  
Indeed, given the tight labor markets in which these converters are operating, it is likely that 
appropriating the pension bonds of employees would be a costly strategy in terms of recruitment 
and retention efforts.  Cash balance conversions appear to be largely driven by labor market 
conditions. In particular, industries with younger, more mobile workers and tighter labor markets 
have a greater concentration of conversions.  Worker mobility may have made retention through 
traditional DB arrangements prohibitively expensive.  In addition, productivity in these 
industries may have become less dependent on long-term contracts with workers.   
Because cash balance conversions directly substitute a DC-like pension for a traditional 
DB plan, they suggest that that regulatory burden is not the only force behind the move to more 
portable pensions.  Nor do these results support the notion that firms are reducing the benefits of 
an aging workforce.  Rather the move toward DC-like pensions is likely the result of increased 
worker mobility.  While many workers who planned to stay with a firm that previously offered a 
traditional DB arrangement will lose expected benefits through a cash balance conversion, the 
earlier accrual and portability of benefits will better facilitate the accumulation of retirement 
wealth for the majority of workers affected by these conversions.  However, these results suggest 
that we should not necessarily expect to eventually see all DB pensions converted to cash 
balance plans.  Certain industries may still rely on productive technology that is enhanced by 
long tenure, and deferred compensation may still be an efficient way to achieve this goal.  
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Figure 1.  Projected Benefit Obligation Under Different Pension Plans 
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Table 1.  Funding Status Prior to Cash Balance Conversion and Change in Benefits 
 
 
Year of 
Conversion
PBO Funding 
Level Prior to 
Conversion
Change in PBO 
 
Change in 
discount 
rate
   unadjusted adjusted  
Manufacturing     
AK STEEL HOLDING CORP 1995 90.1 14.9 13.6 -0.25
BADGER METER INC 1997 116.0 17.5 14.9 -0.5
COMMONWEALTH INDUSTRIES INC 1998 90.6 6.7 9.2 0.5
DONALDSON CO INC 1999 102.3 8.3 12.1 0.75
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 1998 99.2 35.6 38.2 0.5
OWENS CORNING 1996 100.5 22.8 21.5 -0.25
   
Energy   
ALLIANT ENERGY 1998 111.6 1.4 4.0 0.5
UKE ENERGY CORP 1997 74.7 19.5 15.6 -0.75
EL PASO ENERGY PARTNERS 1997 98.6 6.1 1.0 -1
ENRON CORP 1995 105.7 -7.1 -9.7 -0.5
NIGARA MOHAWK HOLDINGS 1999 111.1 -9.1 -3.9 1
   
Telecommunications   
AT&T CORP 1998 141.7 -11.1 -7.3 0.75
BELLSOUTH 1993 115.9 -1.5 1.0 0.5
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND 
TELECOM 1996 118.1 -11.5 -11.5 0
   
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate   
AETNA INC 1999 97.1 -4.2 -0.3 0.75
ALLMERICA FINANCIAL CORP 1995 103.1 -6.2 -14.0 -1.5
AMERICAN EXPRESS 1995 84.3 12.3 10.5 -0.35
CITIGROUP INC 1996 94.1 6.9 5.6 -0.25
NATIONAL CITY CORP 1998 135.2 1.1 0.9 -0.05
PNC BANK 1999 87.5 -1.2 2.7 0.75
SAFECO CORP 1999 112.1 -1.8 0.8 0.5
WELLS FARGO & CO 1999 102.5 6.8 11.9 1
   
Technology and Business Services   
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS 1998 94.6 27.4 25.9 -0.3
INTL BUSINESS MACHINES 1999 114.1 0.1 4.0 0.75
TEKTRONIX INC 1998 95.6 16.5 12.3 -0.8
XEROX CORP 1999 99.0 2.7 2.7 0
   
 Other Industries   
AVON PRODUCTS 1998 88.3 3.3 0.2 -0.6
CSX CORP 1997 81.0 17.8 12.7 -1
GENESCO INC 1996 65.5 11.3 6.1 -1
HANNAFORD BROS 1998 105.0 9.5 9.5 0
RJR NABISCO 1993 88.5 0.3 1.5 0.25
SUBURBAN PROPANE PARTNERS  1998 122.8 -3.6 -2.3 0.25
Firms who were overfunded (bases on PBO) prior to conversion  50%
Firms who reduced (adjusted) PBO through conversion  22%
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Table 2.  Industry Level Data of Employee Characteristics and Benefit Characteristics in 1998 
 
     Industry                     Percent of DB Plans             Percent of Firms Employer to Employer         Percent of      Unemployment 
            Converting  Cash Balance*      with a DB Plan*  Rate   Employees Over 45              Rate 
 
 
Manufacturing    
     Durable   23.0   66   1.8   33.0   3.4 
 
Manufacturing 
     Non-Durable       18.6   81   2.0   32.3   4.7 
 
Transportation   14.3   80   1.3   35.2   4.0 
 
Utilities and Sanitation  24.2   90   1.9   38.8   2.4 
    Services 
 
Communication   50.0   67   1.7   29.8   2.4 
 
Finance, Insurance,  26.0   72   2.5   31.9   2.5 
     and Real Estate 
 
Technology, Business  54.5   50   4.3   26.2   2.9 
     Services 
 
Wholesale Trade   22.2   83   2.4   30.7   3.7 
 
Retail Trade   28.6   49   3.8   21.1   6.0 
 
Mining       0.0   79   2.4   34.4   3.2 
 
Construction     0.0   25   3.5   28.4   7.5 
 
 
*S&P 500 firms Source: Compustat, author’s tabulations from annual 10K report filings of S&P 500 firms, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
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Table 3.  Correlations of Industry Level Data on Employee Characteristics and Plan Characteristics  
 
 
                         Percent of DB Plans              Percent of Firms               Employer to Employer                 Percent of             Unemployment             
            Converting to Cash Balance         with a DB Plan                 Rate         Employees Over 45                Rate             
 
 
Percent of DB Plans     1.000   -.609   0.438   -.507   -.258   
  Converting to Cash 
  Balance Plans 
 
Percent of Firms   -.609   1.000   -.751   0.875   -.302   
 with a DB Plan 
 
Employer to     0.438   -.751   1.000   -.772   0.267   
  Employer Rate 
 
Percent of Employees  -.507   0.875   -.772   1.000   -.545   
  Over 45 
 
Unemployment Rate  -.258   -.302   0.267   -.545   1.000  
  
     
 
 
Source: Compustat, author’s tabulations from annual 10K report filings of S&P 500 firms, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 4.  Determinants of the Probability that a Firm Converted its Traditional DB 
Pension to a Cash Balance Plan* 
 
 
 1998 1994 
 w/o industry dummies 
w/ industry 
dummies 
w/o industry 
dummies 
w/ industry 
dummies 
percent of firms w/ db plan 0.001 (0.38) 
-0.004 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.049 
(8.19) 
employer to employer rate 0.052 (1.51) 
0.063 
(1.87) 
0.099 
(1.81) 
0.130 
(2.44) 
labor force over 45 -0.015 (1.08) 
-0.835 
(0.37) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.030 
(2.26) 
unemployment rate -0.056 (1.83) 
-4.10 
(0.51) 
-0.038 
(1.45) 
-1.66 
(31.34) 
log of plan assets 0.054 (3.18) 
0.04 
(2.88) 
0.055 
(2.91) 
0.047 
(2.77) 
funding percentage -0.000 (0.03) 
-0.000 
(0.19) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
number of observations 317 317 259 259 
pseudo R-squared 0.059 0.097 0.066 0.109 
* Marginal effects are presented with t-statistics shown in parentheses. 
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Endnotes 
 
1   A review of the literature on the demand for pensions by workers and firms can be found in 
Even and MacPherson (2001) and Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994). 
2   Analyses of the role of DB pensions in the labor market can be found in Lazear (1979), 
Hutchens (1989), Mitchell (1990), Even and Macpherson (1992), and Friedberg and Owyang 
(2002). 
3   This assumes forward-looking, rational workers.  If individuals suffer from lack of self-
control, they may appreciate either a DB or DC pension as a commitment mechanism (Laibson, 
Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998).   In the same vein, while DC plans offer individuals control over 
their investments, some may prefer that their employers make those decisions on their behalf 
(Choi, et al., 2001).  
4  Examples of this research include Poterba, Venti and Wise (2001, 1995), Pence (2002), and 
Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994). 
5  These include Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), Ippolito (1995) and Kruse (1995) who all used 
data covering the first half of the 1980s from the Form 5500 filed by private pension plans with 
the Department of Labor. 
6 What employees actually have a right to if they leave the firm is a measure called the 
accumulated benefit obligation (ABO), often referred to as the termination benefit.  In a cash 
balance plan, the ABO and the PBO are not very different.  Without going into technical detail, 
under a traditional DB plan, the ABO is much less than the PBO until the employee is close to 
retirement age.  This is a result of the back-loading of benefits.  Charting the ABO under each 
type of plan would therefore accentuate the relative accrual patterns shown in Chart 1.  We 
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choose to illustrate the different accrual patterns using the PBO as we will use it later in the 
analysis.  
7 Defining such a measure is somewhat problematic given that unemployed workers are 
attributed to the industry where they last worked, though they might find employment in a 
different sector. 
